Price structure in two-sided markets: evidence from the magazine industry (with Julian Wright)
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		Abstract: We present and estimate a model of competition in a two-sided market: the market for magazine readership and advertising. Using data on magazines in Germany, we find evidence that magazines have properties of two-sided markets. The results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are "subsidized" and magazines make most of their money from advertisers. Consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements, our results imply that higher demand or lower costs on the reader side increase ad rates, but that higher demand or lower costs on the advertising side decrease cover prices.
	Additional material - additional proofs download  here - comparative statics download  here - full set of estimation results for benchmark model; download here - full set of estimation results for alternative models (competitive bottleneck model and monopoly-monopoly model) download here - full set of estimation results for "test" of parameter homogeneity; download here Data The data we use in the paper can be downloaded below: - download data description here - download data here Programs - download complete TSP program code for benchmark model here - download additional TSP program codes for alternative demand models here (note this is a zip-file, unzipping produces 12 separate TSP programs; there is a one-tp-one mapping between these programs and the "alternative models" PDF file above) - download TSP code for "test" of parameter homogeneity here Other information - download Ludwig (2003) cost breakdown here - download "first stage" regression results here